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Oct. 5, 1959.]

DOROTHY M. BURDETTE ct al., Appcnant~, v. ROfJLEI<'SON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a Corporation)
-et al., Respondents.

o

[1] Landlord and Tenant-Injuries to Tenant-Contributory Negligence.-In an action for injuries sustained by a tenant in
falling to the public sidewalk froUl SOUle point between the
top of 10 steps from the public sidewalk and the door of her
apartment, to which access from the top of such steps could
be obtained only by traversing a private sidewalk for 30 or
40 feet and then climbing an -additional four steps to a plat- ,
form immediately outside the front door of the apartment,
where the tenant had no memory of what occurred after she
closed the door until she found herself back in her apartment
after the accident, and where there were no eyewitnesses to the
accident, the trial court properly found that the tenant was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The only reasonable inference was that the tenant lost her footing and then tumbled
down the steep embankment to the public sidewalk below and
that a guard rail would have prevented her tumbling to the
public sidewalk whether or not it would have prevented her
initial loss of footing.
[2] IeL-Injuries to Tenant-Necessity for Guard Rails.-In an
action for injuries sustained by a tenant in falling to the public
sidewalk from some point between the top of 10 steps from the
public sidewalk and the door of her apartment, to which access I
from the top of such steps could be obtained only by traversing
a private sidewalk for 30 or 40 feet and then climbing an
additional four steps to a platform immediately outside the
front door of the apartment, where a municipal building code
section required a guard rail "Where a floor . • • or deck is
accessible from a stairway or doorway and the floor ••. or deck
is more than four feet (4') above the adjoining ground or
floor level," and where the private sidewalk was accessible
from a stairway and on one side it was 15 to 18 feet above the
adjoining ground level, it was this lower adjoining ground
level, not the ground level on which the private walk resterl
and which adjoined it on the other side, that was relevant to
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Buildings, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Buildings,
§ 3 et seq.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Landlurd and Tenant, § 137; [2]
!.andlord and Tenant, § 135; [3-5] Buildings, § 1.1; [6] Appeal
and Error, § 119; [7] Landlord and Tenant, § 138(3).
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the application of the code section, since it was there that the
danger lay, and it was immaterial that an agreed statement
of facts described the private walk as being at ground level.
[3] Buildings-Municipal Ordinances or Codes-Construction.-A
private agreement between the pal·ties as to the definition of
"adjoining ground level," as used in a municipal ordinance or \
building code section, could not control the interpretation of
such ordinance or section.
.
[4] Id.-Municipal Ordinances or Codes-Construction.-A private
sidewalk was a "floor .•. or deck" within the meaning of a
municipal ordinance or building code section requiring a guard
rail where a floor or deck is accessible from a stairway or doorway and the floor or deck is more than 4 feet above the adjoining ground or floor level, where the private sidewalk was
a flat space exposed to the open air and it was a platform of
the building on which to walk, thereby resembling a ship's
deck in that it was a distinct level area adjoining the building
between the floor level above and the ground level below.
[5] Id.-Municipal Ordinances or Codes-Construction.-Under a
municipal ordinance or building code section requiring all
traffic lanes to be enclosed by guard rails when a floor or deck
accessible to a door or stairway is more than 4 feet above the
adjoining ground level, a private sidewalk leading from the
floor of a platform outside the door of an apartment house
to the flight of 10 steps to a public sidewalk is a "traffic lane."
Since the code section does not provide that the guard rails
may terminate where the traffic lane reaches the edge of the
immediate level accessible to the door or stairway, the only
reasonable interpretation is that the rails must continue
until the traffic lane reaches a safe level or terminates. A
railing that is not coterminous with the peril against which it
guards may be more dangerous than none at all.
[6] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Ca.se.-.<\ lthough
ordinarily a pal·ty may not deprive his opponent of opportunity to meet an issue in the trial court by changing his theory
on appeal, this rule does not apply ""'hen the facts are not
disputed and the party mercly raises a new question of law.
[7] Landlord and Tenant--Injuries to Tenant--Evidence.-In an
action for injuries sustained by a tenant in .falling to the
public sidewalk from some point between the top of 10 steps
from the public sidewalk and the door of her apartment, to
which access from the top of such steps could be obtained
only by traversing a private sidewalk for 30 or 40 feet and
then climbing an additional four steps to a platform imme[6] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 142.
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diately outside the front door of the Ilpartm('ut, the trial i
court's finding that ddendants' negligence was not the proxi- '
mate cause of the tenant's injuries could not be sustained, not.withstanding the langunge of an agreed statement that there
was no evidence in the record showing or tending to show the
. cause of the injuries, where the only reasonable conclusion
that could be drawn was that such language referred only
to the absence of direct evidence of the cause of the injuries
or of the cause of the tenant's initial loss of footing, where
the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the
record was that a guard rail would have prevented the tenant's
injuries, and where, assuming that such finding could be explained by the theory that defendants were n~gligent only in
failing to provide guard rails for the platform and stairway,
it appeared as a matter of law that they were also negligent
in failing to provide a railing for the private sidewalk, that
the tenant fell at one of those three places, and that a railing
would have prevented her from tumbling to the public sidewalk.

o

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. McIntyre Faries, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by a
tenant in falling to a public sidewalk from some point between
the top of 10 steps from the public sidewalk and the door of her
apartment. Judgment for defendants reversed.
Joseph Schecter for Appellants.
Crider, Tilson & Ruppe, Henry E. Kappler, Milton M.
Cohen and Patti Sacks Karger for Respondents .
. TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment in
favor of defendants after a trial before the court without
a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained by Dorothy M. Burdette (hereinafter referred to
as "plaintiff") in falling to the public sidewalk from a point
outside her apartment.
The appeal is on an agreed statement of facts. Defendant
Hischemoeller, the owner of a lot located at 11305 Biona
Drive in the city of Los Angeles, and defendant Rollefson
Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as "Rollefson") entered into an agref'ment wherein Rollefson was to
erect a six-unit apartment building on the lot. Rollefson
was to participate either in the profit fl'Olll a sale of the
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property or in the rental incollH', in li(~u of a jll·ufi!. oVl'r anll ;
above the actual cost or construction of the bl\ildill~. Shortly
before the building was completed, plaintiff and her husband
leased apartment 2 for a one-year term. Defendants had not
. procured a certificate of occupancy when the Burdettes moved
ill on .October 1, 1956.
The apartment building is situated at the summit of a steep
hill that rises 15 to 18 feet above the public sidewalk. To enter
plaintiff's apartment, it is necessary to leave the public sidewalk, climb a flight of 10 steps, make a right-angle turn,
traverse a private sidewalk that follows the edge of the hill
for 30 or 40 feet, and climb a flight of four steps to a platform
immediately outside the front door of the apartment. No part
of the platform, private sidewalk, or either set of stairs was
enclosed by protective guard rails at the time of the accident.
[1] On October 10, 1956, plaintiff, accompanied by a
friend, was preparing to leave her apartment. She held the
door open for her friend and paused to close the door. The:
friend had almost reached the top of the flight of 10 steps '
leading to the public sidewalk when she heard plaintiff's cries,
turned, and saw plaintiff lying upon the public sidewalk.
Plaintiff has no memory of what occurred after she closed
the door until she found herself back in her apartment after .
the accident. Thus, there were no eyewitnesses to the accident, \
and the tridl court properly found that plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence. (Scott v. Burke, 39 Ca1.2d 388,
394 [247 P.2d 313] ; Gigl·iotti v. Nunes, 45 Ca1.2d 85, 93 [286
P.2d 809] ; Oampagna v. Market St. By. 00., 24 Ca1.2d 304,
309 [149 P.2d 281] ; Gallichotte v. Oalif01·n-ia Mut. etc. Assn.,
4 Cal.App.2d 503, 508 [41 P.2d 349].) Under these circumstances the only reasonable inference is that plaintiff lost her
footing and then tumbled down the steep embankment to the
public sidewalk below and that a guard rail would have prevented her tumbling to the public sidewalk whether or not
it would have prevented her initial loss of footing. The crucial
issue, therefore, is whether or not the accident occurred at a
place where defendants were under a duty to provide n
guard rail.
•
Deft!ndants contend that the Building Code of the city of
Los Angeles required guard rails only for the platform and the
four steps leading to it, and that since the accident may have
occurred after plaiutiff reached the private sidewalk, she
has failed to prove that defendants' Il<:,gligence in 110t pro-
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viding guard rails for the platform and stairs caused her
injury.!
Plaintiff contends that the building codc required guard
"rails for the private sidewalk as well as the stairs and platform, and that since she fell either from the platform, the
"flight of four steps, or the private sidewalk, defendants' negIigenc"e in not providing any guard rails was necessarily the
proximate cause of her injuries.
It is conceded that section 91.3305(g) of the building code
required guard rails for the platform and the flight of four
steps. [2] The dispute centers about the applicability of
section 91.4404 (a), which provides: "Guard Rails Required.
Where a floor, roof or deck is accessible from a stairway or
doorway and the floor, roof or deck is more than four feet (4')
above the adjoining ground or floor level, a protective guard
rail shall be provided in such a manner as to separate completely the doorway from the edge of the floor, roof or deck
and also enclose all traffic lanes and all equipment requiring
periodic servicing." This section was enacted "to safeguard
life and limb" (Building Code, § 91.0315) by preventing
persons from falling from dangerously high horizontal surfaces to which they have access from doorways or stairways,
and it must be interpreted to promote its purpose. The private
sidewalk was accessible from a stairway, and on one side it
was 15 to 18 feet above the adjoining ground level. It was
this lower adjoining ground level, not the ground level on
which the private walk rested and which adjoined it on the
other side, that was relevant to the application of the section,
for it was there that the danger lay. Thus, it is immaterial
that the agreed statement described the private walk as being
at ground level, for the photographs make clear that the
ground level referred to in the agreed statement was not that
of the public sidewalk below but that of the adjoining apartment building on which the private walk also rested. [3] Moreover, even had the parties intended in the agreed statement
to define" adjoining ground level" within the meaning of the
ordinance, thE.'ir private agreement could not control its
'This theory was apparently adopted by the trial court. Thus, after
finding that the absence of guard rails around the platform and the
flight of four steps was a violation of the Builtling Code, the court went
on to find that" ..• it is untrue that the absence of snid hanurailM or
guardrails or the presence of any dangerous or hazardous condition for
which defendants, or either of them, were responsible or aceountable, was
a direct or proximate cause of any fall or other incident which causeu
injury to the plaintiff, DOROTHY M. BURl>ETTE." (Finuings of Fact,
No.6.)
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interpretation. (See Desny v. Wilder, 46 Ca1.2d 715, 729 [29!J
P.2d 257] ; San Fra-l1ci.sco humber 00. v. Bibb, 139 Cal. 325,
326 [73 P. 864].)
[4] Defendants contend, however, that the private sidc\mlk \\'as not a "floor ... or deck" within the meaning of the
ordinance. "Deck" has been defined as "a flat space, resembling or likened to a ship's deck, esp. when exposed to
the open air; ... " (Webster's New International Dietionary,
2d ed., 1941, p. 680.) "Floor" has been defined as "The
surface, or the platform, of a structure on which to walk, work,
or travel; ... " (Webster's New International Dictionary,
Sltpra, at p. 970.) The private sidewalk was a flat space exposed to the open air, and it was a platform of the building
on which to walk. It resembled a ship's deck in that it was
a distinct level area adjoining the building between the floor
level above and the ground level below. Like a ship's promenade deck bordered by ship's cabins on one side and the
ship's side on the other, it was dangerous if it lacked a railing
at its e<:Ige. Although it might usually be described as a
sidewalk, it was also a "floor ... or deck" within the meaning
of the ordinance reasonably construed to promote its manifest
objectives.
[5] The private sidewalk was also a "traffic lane" leading
from the floor of the platform outside the door to the flight
of 10 steps. Section 91.4404(a) requires all traffic lanes to
be enelosed by guard rails when a floor or deck accessible to
a door or stairway is mOJ:e than 4 feet above the adjoining
ground level. It does not provide that the guard rails may
terminate where the traffic lane reaches the edge of the
immediate level accessible to the door or stairway, and the
only reasonable interpretation is that the rails must continue
until the traffic lane reaches a safe level or terminates. Otherwise the ordinance would sanction a trap. A guard rail
begets reliance, and it.'l termination suggests safety. A railing that is not coterminous with the peril against which it
guards may he more dangerous than none at aU. (See La-ir<l
v. T. W. Mather, 111 C., 51 Ca1.2d 210, 216,218 [331 P.2d 617].)
Defendants contend, however, that the ('ourt eannot apply
section 91.4404(a) -to the fads of this ('a~e, 011 the ground
t]lut to do so wOlIl(l pt'rmit. plaintiff to (·hange the theory of
her case on aplwa1. This cOlIl"ntioll is wilhout mel'it. [6] Althougb orJiwu'ily a pal'!y may 1I0t d"'pri\'e his opponent of all
opportunity to meet an issue in the tI'ial .'ourt by changing
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his theory on appeal, this rule does not apply when, as in
·this casc, the facts are not disputed and the party merely
. raises a new question of law. (Ward v. Taggarl, 51 Ca1.2d
736,742 [336 P.2d 534] ; Panopulos v. Maderis,47 Ca1.2d 337,
340-341 [303 P.2d 738].)
[7] Defeudants contend that the trial court's finding that
their negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries is supported by the language of the agreed statement
that "there is no evidence in the entire record showing or
tending to show the cause of plaintiff's injuries." As we have
seen, however, there is evidence that compels the conclusion
that one cause of plaintiff's injuries was the absence of a guard
rail at the place she fell. We cannot assume that by including .
the quoted language in the agreed statement, plaintiff agreed
that her appeal was without merit and that we should disregard the record. (Palmer v. City of Long Beach, 33 Ca1.2d
134, 144 [199 P.2d 952].) The only reasonable conclusion
that can be drawn from the record is that the quoted language
refers only to the absence of direct evidence of the cause of
the injuries or of any evidence of the cause of plaintiff's
initial loss of footing. To interpret it to mean that there is
no evidence that a guard rail would have prevented plaintiff's;
tumbling to the public sidewalk 15 to 18 feet below would :
render the agreed statement self-stultifying, for the only in- i
ference that can reasonably be drawn from the record is that '
a guard rail would have prevented plaiutiff's injuries. The
trial court's finding that defendants' negligence was not the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries may be explained by its
theory, apparently acquiesced in by plaintiff below, that defendants were negligent only in failing to provide guard
r~ for the platform and stairway and that there was no
evidence that plaintiff did not fall from the private sidewalk.
Since it appears as a matter of law, however, that defendants
were negligent in failing to provide a railing for the platform,
the stairway, and the private sidewalk, that pJaintiff fell at
one of those three places, and that a railing would have prevented her tumbling to the public sidewalk, the trial court's
finding that defendants' negligence was not the proximate
cause of her injuries cannot be sustained. (Bisgett v. S01tth
S.P. Belt Ry. Co .• 67 Ca1.App. 325. 328 [227 P. 6711 ; Murray
v. Southern Pacific Co .• ]77 Cal. 1. 10 [169 P. 6751 ; 1'myle71
v. Citraro, 112 Cal.App. 172, 174-175 [297 P. 649J [heal"ing
denied by this court] ; Edgar v. Citraro, ]12 Cal.App. 178, 180
[297 P. 654] [hearing denied by this eourt]; Gallichotte v.
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Cali.fornia Mut. etc. A~SIl., 4 Cal.App.2d 503, 507-509 [41
P.2d 349] ; Hes.~ion v. City &- County of San Francisco, 122
Cal.App.2d 592, 603 [265 P.2d 542] j Alarid v. Vanier, 50
.. Cal.2d 617, 621 [327 P.2d 897].)
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and Peek, J. pro tem.,· concurred.

o

McCOMB, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion, in my
view, reaches an anomalous result.
First, it is conceded by the plaintiff in the agreed statement of fact that there is no evidence in the entire recoru
showing or tending to show the cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Second, the record discloses a total absence of any evidence as to how the accident occurred. The record merely
reveals that plaintiff testified that "she stepped out of the
door on to the platform, turned so that she faced the door,
and claims that the last thing she remembers is pulling the
door closed. She claims that the next thing she knew she
was in her own apartment, which was after the accident had
occurred, and after she had been injured."
Hence, we have the novel result of the majority opinion
disregarding the established rule that every intendment and
presumption not contradicted by or inconsistent with the
record on appeal must be indulged in favor of the judgment of
the trial court. (4 Cal.Jur.2d (1952), Appeal and Error,
§ 559, p. 426; § 571, p. 444.)
In place of this rule, the majority opinion disregards the
finding of the trial court that defendant's alleged negligence
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In place
of such finding, it speculates "that plaintiff fell at one of
those three places, and that a railing would have prevented
her tumbling to the public sidewalk." This, of course, overlooks the long established rule that the burden is upon the
plaintiff to introduce evidence proving the proximate causal
connection between the injury or damage com,plained of and
the alleged negligence of the defendant. It is not sufficient
that a negligent act of the defendant might have been the
proximate cause of the accident. (35 Ca1.Jur.2d (1957),
Negligence, § 71, p. 577.)
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, with an
opinion reading thus:
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants
• Assigned by ChairDl:ul of Judicial Council.
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after trial before the court without a jury in an action to :
recover damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff
Dorothy Burdette (hereinafter referred to as "plaint~")
"from a fall onto a public sidewalk in front of the apartment
in which she lived.
. Facts: The present appeal is upon an agreed statement of i
.facts, which discloses that defendant HischemoeUer was the '[
owner of a lot at 11305 Biona Drive, West Los Angeles. He,
entered into an agreement with defendaut Rollefson COll- .
struction Company (hereinafter referred to as "Rollefson"),
wherein Rollefson was to erect a six-unit apartment building
on the lot.
After the bnilding had been completed, Rollefson was to
participate in either the profit from the sale of the property
or a portion of the income from the property in lieu of a
profit over and above the actual cost of erecting the buildiug.
When the building was nearing completion, apartment 2
was leased to plaintiff and her husband for a year's occupancy.
beginning October 1, 1956, the date upon which they moved
into the apartment. The premises, and particularly apartment 2, were shown to plaintiff during the mouth of September. At that time she was advised that there was no
railing yet installed around the platform or stairway leadiug
to apartment 2 but that one would be installed later.
The building was reached by ascending a flight of 10 steps
leading from the public sidewalk below the building to a
private exterior sidewalk at the top of this stairway. The
private sidewalk was approximately 30 to 40 feet in length
and was situated on "ground level" immediately in front of
plaintiff's apartment. At the end of the 30 to 40-foot walk
was a short flight of four steps leading to a small platform,
which was immediately outside of the door of plaintiff's
apartment. The platform, the steps, and the sidewalk, which
extended 30 to 40 feet, all faced and were immediately contiguous to the front yard of the building, which yard sloped
down to the public sidewalk for a distance of approximately
15 to 18 feet.
Prior to October 1, 1956, an inspection of thl! premises wa.~
made by the city. Pursuant to the requirement of the city's
building department, cement work was redone on the steps
and platform sometime between October 1 and October 10,
1956. During that time the workman assisted plaintiff over
the new cement.
A contract had been let by Rollefson to a subcontractor
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for the fabrication and installation of a railing around the
platform and steps. This was to be done after all other work
on the platform and steps had been completed.
On October 10, 1956, plaintiff had a friend, Louise Green, ;
visiting her. Plaintiff and Louise Green were leaving plain- '
tiff's apartment. Plaintiff opened the door and held it for
her friend to precede her, intending to follow immediately.
Louise Green went out the door of apartment 2, stepped on
the platform, made a right turn, went down the four steps
and proceeded a distance of approximately 30 feet when she
heard someone crying and, looking down, saw plaintiff lying
on the public sidewalk. Louise Green did not know how plain- •
tiff got to the sidewalk, nor could she recall the position of
plaintiff's body with reference to the platform or the small
flight of four steps or any portion of the 30 to 40-foot sidewalk. Thus, it was impossible to determine from her testimony, or any other evidence, from what portion of the premises plaintiff commenced her fall.
Plaintiff claimed that she stepped out of the door onto the
platform and turned so that she was facing the door; that
the last she remembered was pulling the door closed; and that
the next thing she knew she was in her own apartment
suffering from injuries.
At the above-mentioned times the following ordinances of
the city of Los Angeles were in force:
"Section 91.0315. (a) Certificate Required. In order to
safeguard life and limb, health, property, and public welfare,
every building or structure shall conform to the construction
requirements for the Sub-group Occupancy to be housed
therein, or for the use to which the structure is to be put,
as specified ...•
"No building or structure or portion thereof shall be used
or occupied until a Certificate of Occupancy has been issued
therefor .... "
"Section 91.3305, Subsection (g) ... Every exterior stairway shall have a handrail on the outer edge. ,Stairways more
than four feet (4') in width shall be provided with handrails
on each side. ' ,
"Section 91.4404 (a) Guard Rails Required. Where a
floor, roof or deck is accessible from a stairway or doorway
aud the floor, roof or deek is more than four feet (4') above
the udjoiuiug" ground or floor level, a pl'oteetive guard rail
shall be provided in such a manner as to separate completely
the doorway from the edge of the floor, roof or deck and also
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enclose all traffic lanes and all equipment requiring periodic
servicing. "
The trial court fOUlld that defenliants were negligent in
failing to provide handrails or guardrails for the steps and
platform by the door.
. The court also found (1) that the absence of handrails or
guardrails did not cause plaintiff to be catapulted or thrown
down a decline to the sidewalk or cause her to sustain severe
or any personal injuries, and (2) that the absence of said
handrails or guardrails, or the presence of any dangerous or
hazardous condition for which defendants or either of them
were responsible or accountable, was not a direct or proximate
cause of any fall or other incident which caused injury to
plaintiff. It entered judgment accordingly in favor of defendants.
This is the sole question necessary to determine: Does the

o

record disclose that as a matter of law there was 110 evide'Me
to sustain the trial court's finding that the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury was Mt the absence of handrails or guardrails, or any other act of defenda.nis, or either of them'
No. These principles are here controlling:
1. The burden rests on an appellant (plaintiff in this case)
to show the insufficiency of the evidence where findings are
assailed on appeal as not supported by the evidence. (Nichols
v. Mitchell, 32 Ca1.2d 598, 600 [197 P.2d 550] ;1 Munns v.
Stenman, 152 Cal.App.2d 543, 555 [4] [314 P.2d 67] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; SeaWe, l1/.c. v. Finster, 149
Cal.App.2d 612, 619 [7] [309 P.2d 51] ; Barlin v. Barz.ill, 145
Cal.App.2d 390, 393 [2]-[3] [302 P.2d 457]; Linehan v.
Linehan, 134 Cal.App.2d 250, 255 [4] [285 P.2d 326] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; Helm v. Hess, 131 Cal.
1In Nicho18 v. MitcheU, "'PTa, p. 600, this eourt said: "As ground for
reversal detendants urge the insuffieieney ot the evidence to !lUstain
the findings that the realty involved was their eommunity property, and
not the separate property ot Mrs. Mitchell. Sueh contention requires
clcfendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support t.he challenged findings. As was stated in the oft-cited ease of
Crawford v. Soothern Pacific Co., 3 Ca1.2d 427, at page 429 [45 P.2d 183]:
' ..• the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uTlcontradicted, ' which will support the findings, and when 'two or
more inferences can be reasonably deduced trom the facts, the reviewing
court is without power to substitute its deduetions for those of the trial
court.' (See, also, Raggio v. Mallory, 10 Ca1.2d 7:!:1. 72!i r70 P.2d GoOl;
Fischer v. Keen, 43 Cal.App.2d 244, 248 [110 P.2d 693]; Lahcrty v.
Connell, 04 Cal.App.2d 355, 357 [148 P.2d 895]; Wuest Y. Wue.st, 72 Cal.
App.2d 101, 104 [164 P.2d 32].)"
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App.2d 251, 255 [280 P.2d 155] ; Wallace v. Thompson, 129
Cal.App.2d 21, 22 [1] (276 P.2d 108] ; Kircknavy v. Levet,
127 Cal.App.2d 586, 588 [2] [274 P.2d 161] ; Rosati v. Heinumn, 126 Cal.App.2d 51, 54 [2] [271 P.2d 953] ; Furst v.
Scharer, 119 Cal.App.2d 605,610 [5] [260 P.2d 198); Industrjal In.dem. Co. v. Golden State Co., 117 Cal.App.2d 519, 538
[17] [256 P.2d 677]; Curtiss v. McGowan, 109 Cal.App.2d
436,438 [240 P.2d 997] ; Trancoso v. Trallcoso, 96 Cal.App.2d
797, 798 [2] [216 P.2d 172] ; Cleverd011 v. Gmy, 62 Cal.App.
2d 612,619 [8] [145 P.2d 95] [hearing denied by the Supreme
Court] ; Estate of Comino, 55 Cal.App.2d 806, 810 [1] [131
P.2d 599 J; Bedford v. Pacific S. W. Corp., 121 Cal.App.
162, 163 [1] [8 P.2d 558] ; Bayside Land Co. v. Dabney, 90
Cal.App. 126, 130 [4] [265 P. 566] [hearing denied by the
Supreme Court].)
2. In order to warrant a judgment for negligence, the
plaintiff must prove (i) that the defendant has committed
a wrongful act and (ii) that said wrongful act was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It
not sufficient that the
evidence raises merely a conjecture, a suspicion, or speculation
that the defendant has committed a wrongful act. 2

i

is

"In NU1Ineley v. EdgOlf' Hotel, 36 Ca1.2d 493, 498 [225 P.2d 497], this
eourt said: "Furthermore, no liability ean be predicated upon non·
compliance with a statutory eommand if the act or omission had no
causal connection with the plaintiff's injury. (Blodgett ,'. B. H. Dycu
Co., 4 Ca1.2d 511, 513 [50 P.2d 801]; Wohlenberg v. Malcewicz, 56 Cal.
App.2d 508, 512 [133 P.2d 12].) Otherwise stated, ' •.• the act or
omission must proximately cause or contribute to the injury.' (Hitson v.
Dwyer, 61 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [143 P.2d 952].) In the Blodgett case,
the plaintiff sustained injury from falling down a stairway which, in
violation of an ordinance, was not equipped with a center handrail. In
affirming a judgment of nonsuit the court said: 'The evidence shows that
the lack of the handrail was neither the proximate nor any cause of
plaintiff's fall. Any violation of the ordinancc b,. the (lefendant would,
therefore, be immaterial.' "
In Hill v. Matthews Paint Co., 149 Cal.App.2d 714, 723 [308 P.2d
865], the court said: "(1) To be entitled to n judgment based on neg·
ligence, plaintiff must prove that defendant's act of wrongful omission
is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. (Valdez v. Taylor .&uto·
mobile Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 821 [278 P.2d 91]; Holmes v. Moesser,
120 Cal.App.2d 612, 614 [262 P.2d 27].) (2) The burden of proof.
devolves on plaintiff to show the causal connt'ction betweon the allegeu
negligence and the resulting injury. (Petersen v. Lewis, 2 Cal.2d 569,
572 [42 P.2d 311]; McKellar v. Pendergast, ti8 Cal.App.2d 485, 489
[156 P.2d 950].) (3) Where the negligence proved is not fastened to
the particular injury for which recovery is sought. • the ease stand~
exactly as if no negligence lIad bet'n proven.' (Pllckllaber v. SOllth~f"fl
Pac. Co., 132 Cal. 363, 364 [64 P. 480]; SP"llc,'r Y. Beatty Satlt'ay
Sca.ffo/d Co., 141 Cal.App.2d 87;;, 880 [:!97 P.::!d 746]; Davis v. Lanp,
24 Cn1.App.2d 400. 40;; [75 P.2d.565].) (·n The qucRtion of wllether
plaintiff has sl1stainc.l the burden of establishing thnt defendant's neg·
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3. Where llO evidellce, or insufficient evidence, is introduced
on an issue, the finding on that issue must be against the party
who has the burden of proof. (Rancho Santa Margarita v.
Vail, 11 Ca1.2d 501, 543 [15] [81 P.2d 533]; Estate of Mc'Kenna, 143 Cal. 580, 592 [77 P. 461] ; Walbergh v. Moudy,
164 Cal.App.2d 786, 790 [2] [331 P.2d 234] [hearing denied
by the Supreme Court] ; Sullivan v. Ka1ltel, 124 Cal.App.2d
723,725 [2] [269 P.2d 175].)
Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the present
case, the record discloses that there was a question of fact
presented to the trier of fact, to wit, was defendants' failure
to provide protective handrails or guardrails the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries' The trier of fact found that it
was not. This finding is supported by the record, for these
reasons:
First: The agreed statement of fact contains the following:
". . . there is no evidence in the entire record showing or
tending to show the cause of plaintiff's injuries. "3
ligence was the cause in fact from which his injury resulted is ordinarily
for the trier of the facts. (Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-R088 Tool Co., 125
Cal.App.2d 578, 603 [271 P.2d 122]; Beef!. v. Lummus Co., 76 Cal.App.2d
288, 294 [173 P.2d 34].) (5) When there is evidence that the injury
may be reasonably attributed to a cause for which no liability attaches
to defendant, it is proper to find against plaintiff on the issue of negligence."
In Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), page 222, it is said: "On the
issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues essential to his ease,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof. He nlUst introduce evidence which
affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than
not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in the
result. A mere possibility of BUch causation is not enough; and when
the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court
to direct a verdict for the defendant."
(Bee to the same effect Burtt v. Banlc of California Nat. ABm., 211
Cal. 548, 551 [2] [296 P. 68]; Mar8iglia v. Dosier, 161 Cal. 403, 405
[119 P. 505]; Puclchaber v. Bouthern Pacific Co., 132 Cal. 363, 364
et seq. [64 P. 480]; Towle v. Pacific Impr01Jement Co., 98 Cal. 342, 346
[33 P. 207]; Holme8 v. Moe88Br, 120 Cal.App.2d 612, 614 [1] [262 P.2d
27] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; Neuber v. Royal Realty
Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 596, 630 [25] [195 P.2d 501] [hearing denied by
the Supreme Court]; MeKellar v. Pendergast, 68 Cal.App.2d 485, 489
[2a] [156 P.2d 950].)
•
·On page 3 et seq. of the Agreed Statement appears the following:
., On October 10, 1956, plaintiff, Dorothy Burdette, claims that she had
a friend, Louise Green, visiting her. Plaintiff and Louise Green were
leaving plaintiff's apartment and plaintiff testifie<l that she opened
the door and held it for ber said friend to precede ber, intending to follow
immediately thereafter. Louise Green went out the cloor of Apartment
#2, which door entered into the apartment, stepped on the platform,
made a right turn, went down the four steps and proceeded a distance
of approximately 30 feet, at which time she heard someone crying, and
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Where there is an agreed statement of fact, the appellat.u
court will assume for all purposes of reviewing the action of
the trial court that the agreed statement contains a correct.
statement of what took place. (McMullen v. Saunders, 138
·Cal.App.2d 554, 555 [1] [292 P.2d 282] [hearing denied by
the Supreme Court].)
In view of the foregoing stipulation as to the facts, the
trial court's finding of fact in favor of defendants is supported by the record.
Second: Plaintiff testified " ... she stepped out of the door
on to the platform, turned so that she faced the door, and
claims that the last thing she remembers is pulling the door
closed. She claims that the next thing she knew she was in
her own apartment, which was after the accident had occurred,
and after she had been injured. "
Therefore, under rules 2 and 3, supra, plaintiff failed to
sustain the burden of proof in the trial court of establishing
that defendants' negligent act was the proximate cause of
her injury.
So far as the record discloses, the proximate cause of plaintiff's fall remains unknown, the cause thereof being merely
a matter of conjecture, suspicion, or speCUlation. So far as
the record discloses, she may have fainted, or deliberately
jumped, or been shoved off the porch or walk; or her injury
may have been proximately caused by a variety of other acts.
Likewise, thc record is devoid of any evidence showing where
plaintiff left the walk, which was between 30 and 40 feet in
length.
then looked down and saw the plaintiff down on the public sidewalk.
Louise Green did not know how plaintiff, Dorothy Burdette, got to the
sidewalk. The plaintiff, Dorothy Burdette, claimed that she stepped
out of the door on to the platform, turned so that she was facing the
door, and claims that the last she remembers is pulling the door closed.
She claims that the nc:rl thing she knew she was in her own apartment,
which was after the accident had occurred, and after she had been in·
jured. There i8 no testimony in t1,e entire record showing how plaintiff,
Dorothy Burdette, got to the public sidewalk; there is no testimony or
evidence in the entire record to show from what point plaintiff, Dorothy
Burdette, left the upper or gr01lnd level of the apartment house, i.e.,
whether she left the upper level from the platform, from the steps, or
from the private sidewalk, all of which abutted the sloping front yard;
t1,ere i8 no testimony or evidence in the entire record tending to show at
tL.hat place on the lower or public sidewalk the plaintiff was found; plain·
tiff '9 friend, Louise Green, was the only party who testified that plaintiff
was on the puhlic sidewalk, and she stated t1mt she dill not observe or
re,!,-embe~ whether p!aintiff was in line with the platform, the steps, or the
pnvate SIdewalk whIch abutted the top of the Rlope; there is no evidence
i" the entire record showing or tending to show the calloSe of plaintiff's
'''juries.'' (lalies added.)
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A plaintiff cannot recover where the facts go no further
than to establish a possibility that a defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of his injury. (See Petersen v. Lcll'i.~,
2 Ca1.2d 569, 572 [2] [42 P.2d 311] ; Hill v. Matthews Paint
Co., 149 Cal.App.2d 714, 724 [11] [308 P.2d 865] ; Spencer v.
Beatty Salway Scaffold Co., 141 Cal.App.2d 875, 882 [4]-[5]
[297 P.2d 746] ; McKellar v. Pe1ldergast, 68 CaLApp.2d 485,
489 [4] [156 P.2d 950].)
Clearly, plaintiff failed to sustain in the trial court the
burden of proof incumbent upon her to show that any negligent act of defendants was the proximate cause of her
injury. Therefore, an essential element of her case was not
proven, and the trial court's finding that defendants' negligent act was not the proximate cause of her injury is fully
sustained by the evidence.
From the foregoing it is evident that plaintiff has failed
to sustain the burden of proof required by rule 1 of showing
that the finding of the trial court is, as a matter of law, contrary to the facts disclosed by the record and therefol'e not
sustained by the evidence.
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
The petition of respondent Herbert Hischemoeller for a
rehearing was denicd November 3, 1959. White, J., did not
participate therein. Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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